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GOD'S GOODNESS NEEDS NO PRIVILEGE: 
A REPLY TO FUNKHOUSER 
Thomas D. Senor 
According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection 
(what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser 
gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funk-
houser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, 
contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's 
attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God 
cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed with (i) and 
(ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments. 
Introduction 
In his paper "On Privileging God's Moral Goodness," Eric Funkhouser 
argues that the properties of omnipotence and necessary goodness are in-
compatible. Funkhouser argues further that attempts to solve this problem 
have sometimes led theists to mis-define 'omnipotence' and to corrupt "a 
pE'rfectly good word." Interestingly, Funkhouser does not take the upshot 
of his argument to be that there is something conceptually amiss with the 
concept of God, but only with its explication by philosophers of religion. 
Funkhouser has no particular beef with the view that God is necessarily 
good and has whatever power is consistent with that, provided that such 
power is seen to fall short of omnipotence. 
I am not persuaded by Funkhouser's argument. I see no philosophi-
cal, semantic, or even lexical difficulties in assigning to God the proper-
ties of necessary goodness and omnipotence. This paper is an attempt to 
explain why. 
Section 1: A Brief Aside 
Before launching into Funkhouser's argument, I'd like to first note that 
while the problem that concerns Funkhouser is indeed a prima facie prob-
lem for the compossibility of omnipotence and necessary goodness (or as 
Funkhouser sometimes says impeccability), the difficulty can be generated 
even on a somewhat weaker conception of divine goodness. The problem 
(such as it is) concerns the compatibility of omnipotence with God's being 
unable to do certain things because of his "perfect goodness." Let's say a 
being is perfectly good if it never violates a moral principle that applies 
to it, and if it acts in accordance with all relevant moral principles. Now if 
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perfect goodness is an essential property of God, then it follows that there 
are no worlds in which God acts against a moral principle, and we are on 
our way to generating the incompatibility problem. However, the same 
difficulty can be generated even if we think of God's perfect goodness as 
stable and not essential. A property P is stable for a being B at a world W 
iff (a) B exemplifies P at all times in Wand (b) there is nothing B can do to 
make it the case that B ceases to exemplify Pin W. Put somewhat different-
ly, if a person has a property in a stable way, there are no worlds accessible 
to her in which she doesn't have it. Exemplifying a property in a stable way 
is, for all practical purposes, as limiting as having that property essentially. 
For example, suppose that in world WI, Ray has the stable (but accidental) 
property of being blind. Then not only does Ray not see-Ray can't see in 
WI, even though there are other worlds in which Ray has 20/20 vision. 
Now if God's perfect goodness is stable but accidental, then there are 
no worlds accessible to God where God violates a principle or fails to act 
in accordance with moral principles. Thus there are no worlds accessible 
at which God does something wrong, and the prima facie problem at the 
heart of Funkhouser's paper is with us even if God's perfect goodness is 
not essential. 
Section 2: Funkhouser's First Argument 
Since his first argument is commendably clear, I won't spend much time 
rehearsing it. The fundamental idea is that a necessary condition of being 
omnipotent is that it not be possible that there be a being who is able to 
do everything you do and more besides. But if God is necessarily good 
(or impeccable) then God can't do anything that would violate a moral 
principle. Yet we can conceive of a being who is able to do everything God 
can do but who lacks impeccability. Such a being would also be able to do 
actions that violate moral principles. So such a being would be able to do 
everything God can do and then some. But since it is a necessary condi-
tion of omnipotence that it is not possible that there is a being who can 
do everything an omnipotent being can do and more besides, then God is 
not omnipotent. 
Later in his paper, Funkhouser offers a second version of the argument 
that doesn't depend on the possible existence of a being who can do every-
thing an impeccable God can do and then some. However, in this section 
of my paper, I want to focus on the original argument. We'll have a look at 
the second version in the next section. 
As noted above, Funkhouser's argument depends on this premise: 
P3. There is a possible being with the power to bring about all the 
states of affairs that God can bring about and then some (e.g. morally 
bad states of affairs). 
Funkhouser concedes that the Anselmian theist will reject P3. For accord-
ing to the Anselmian conception of God, God is the greatest possible be-
ing, the being with the greatest possible array of the great-making proper-
ties. So such a being will exist necessarily and be the most powerful being 
at any world at which it exists. l But then it will be the most powerful being 
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at every world, so there are no worlds at which there is a being with the 
power to bring about the states of affairs that God can bring about and 
then some. So there is no such possible being, and P3 is false. Now it might 
be that we can conceive of a being that can do everything God can plus 
various immoral acts, but this is just an instance of conceivability being a 
poor guide to possibility. 
Funkhouser thinks this reply is inadequate. Why? Perhaps surprising-
ly, he aims his response not at the heart of the Anselmian's argument but 
instead at her explanation for why the ability to conceive of a person more 
powerful than the Anselmian God is not a reliable sign that such a person 
is possible. Funkhouser writes: 
[T]he typical examples of alleged conceivability-to-possibility fail-
ures are different in kind. They involve either a misdescription of a 
genuine possibility (e.g., conceiving of watery-stuff as water instead 
of the distinct chemical kind XYZ) or a sketchy conception due to 
ignorance of scientific or mathematical/logical facts (e.g., conceiv-
ing of this exact same physical stuff but without consciousness, or 
conceiving of the falsity of Fermat's Last Theorem). My conception 
of a being with the powers of God, plus the powers to bring about 
immoral states of affairs, fits neither pattern. It does not involve a 
misdescription, since I am not assigning any name at all to the be-
ing I imagine-I am simply imagining it with certain powers. Nor 
does this conception seem to play on any scientific or logical igno-
rance-How could adding the power to stab the innocent violate a 
law of nature or logic? Instead, such a "possibility" is supposed to 
be ruled out by some strange, sui generis force of metaphysical neces-
sity. The mind boggles when contemplating the nature of this force 
that forestalls the realization of the more-powerful being I imagine. 
One could always claim that conceivability is no guarantee of pos-
sibility, but for particular cases an explanation of the alleged failure 
should be at hand.2 
So Funkhouser agrees that the third premise of his original argument is 
true only if the Anselmian conception of God (at least when construed as 
demanding the impeccability of God) is logically impossible. 
Here's the essence of what I take to be Funkhouser's argument against 
Anselmianism: 
There is a possible being B who can do everything the Anselmian 
God (were one to exist) can do and more besides. So there is a world 
W at which B is the most powerful being. But the Anselmian God, 
if he exists, is the most powerful being at every world in which he 
exists and he is necessarily existent. Since B is the most powerful be-
ing in W, the Anselmian God doesn't exist at W, and hence doesn't 
exist at any world. His existence is, then, logically impossible. Now 
it might be that we can conceive of a being who exists at all worlds 
and who is the most powerful being at every world at which he ex-
ists but this is just an instance of conceivability being a poor guide 
to possibility. 
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But what's to stop the Anselmian from using an argument structurally 
like Funkhouser's against Funkhouser himself? After all, the Anselmian 
can reasonably say that there seems to be nothing incoherent in her con-
cept of a necessary being who is the most powerful being at any world 
at which it exists; that is, this is conceivable. And it isn't as though this 
conception depends on either a misdescription or ignorance of some fact 
of science/math/logic. Therefore, we should think it possible, and any ar-
gument for its impossibility must be mistaken. So the Anselmian can give 
the following argument that, it seems to me, is on epistemic equal-footing 
with Funkhouser's: 
There is a possible being, G, who necessarily exists, is impeccable, 
and who is the most powerful being at every world at which he ex-
ists. There is, then no world at which there is a being, B, who can do 
everything the G can do and more besides. That is to say, B's exis-
tence is logically impossible. Now it might be that we can conceive of 
a being who can do everything G can do and more besides but this is 
just an instance of conceivability being a poor guide to possibility. 
This argument seems to me at least as good as Funkhouser's. And if we 
have a argumentative draw here, then the Anselmian is within her epis-
temic rights in rejecting premise three of Funkhouser's original argument. 
I suggested above that the Anselmian's and Funkhouser's arguments 
are equally plausible, but that actually seems to me to be giving too much 
credit to the latter. For Funkhouser's argument depends crucially on there 
being a very cozy relationship between conceivability and possibility. 
Surely the only reason Funkhouser will give for thinking it possible that 
there exists a being who can do everything God is thought able to do and 
then some is that we can conceive of such a thing. But the theist is unlikely 
to claim that her primary reason for thinking that the Anselmian God ex-
ists is that she can conceive of it. So conceivability is playing a larger role 
in Funkhouser's possibility claim than it is in that of the theist. 
We should be wary of claims that, in almost all cases, the conceivable 
is possible. For if logical possibility is an objective and fundamental meta-
physical category, then it would seem highly surprising if the powers of 
conceivability with which God, or Mother Nature, has blessed us would 
track the logically possible. One can recognize that, existence proofs aside, 
conceivability is the best available guide to possibility. But that doesn't 
mean that it is, all things considered and in every context, a good guide. 
Particularly when we are considering matters very far from the concerns 
of our everyday lives (where it is practically important that we have some 
sense of what is possible and what isn't), we should not put too much 
stock into the conceptions and mental pictures we can draw as revealing 
to us the scope of the possible.3 
Section 3: Funkhouser's Second Argument 
Although he stands by his original argument and the truth of its third 
premise, Funkhouser recognizes that what he has to say on the matter 
is unlikely to convince the Anselmian. So later in his paper he offers a 
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version of the argument that does not require that controversial prem-
ise. Loosely, the newer version argues that because there are things that 
limited beings like humans can do that God cannot (things that do not 
themselves depend upon our metaphysical limitations), God is not om-
nipotent. Humans can and do violate moral principles; God doesn't and 
can't. But if there are things that we can do and that God can't, then God 
isn't omnipotent. 
This version of the argument turns our attention where I think it should 
have been all along. The problem isn't that there are possible beings with 
more power than God, but only that there are beings with powers that God 
lacks (because that means that there are limits to what God can do that 
aren't logical limits). If God is impeccable there are things that God can't do 
that we would expect an omnipotent being to be able to do, if for no other 
reason than that we are able to do them. 
] believe that in the first argument and in the second, premise two can 
be reasonably resisted. Recall that this premise reads: 
2. God does not have the power to (Le., cannot) bring about morally 
bad states of affairs. God is impeccable, or essentially morally good. 
(Assumption) 
In his defense of 2, Funkhouser argues against the following objection: 
from the claim that God is impeccable together with the facts as we know 
them, it does follow that there are things God can't do that other possible 
and actual individuals can. But, the objector will continue, the reason God 
can't do these things is not because God lacks the power to do them but 
because God (necessarily) lacks the will to do them. Funkhouser's second 
premise mistakenly equates uS cannot X" and "s lacks the power to X." 
As it turns out, I think this objection is not as easily dispensed with as 
Funkhouser believes. 
Let's consider an example of Funkhouser's: God cannot stab an inno-
cent child for no reason. One who accepts impeccability will agree with 
Funkhouser that not only will God not do such a thing; God cannot do 
such a thing. Funkhouser and I agree on this. But Funkhouser wants to go 
from "God cannot do X but others can" to "God is not omnipotent." Now 
I grant such an inference is tempting; it is not for nothing that accounts 
of omnipotence are often formulated in terms of the ability to perform 
actions. Yet I think such accounts are wrong and such an inference is to 
be resisted. We can learn something about the nature of power and its re-
lation to intentional action by seeing why power limitations don't follow 
from ability limitations. 
Suppose we raise the question of whether I can lift the rather large rock 
in front of me. It might seem that if we ask if I have the power to lift it, 
we've asked the same question. As Funkhouser notes, Erik Wielenberg 
has provided an example in which these two questions might seem to 
come apart. For if the stone is suitably greased, I might not have the ability 
to lift it, even though I would have that ability were it not greased. In such 
a case it is natural to say that I have the power to lift the stone (i.e., I am 
generally capable of lifting objects of that size and weight) even though I 
can't lift the stone (or, as we are not using the expression, I now lack the 
ability to lift the stone). 
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While I think that Wielenberg's case is telling as far as it goes, I want 
to suggest that there are better analogies to argue against the thesis that 
what one can do is precisely the same as what one has the power to 
bring about. 4 
Accounts of omnipotence in particular, and of power in general, in 
terms of what states of affairs a being can bring about are misleading in at 
least one important way. To see this, let's note that when we care about 
such accounts we aren't interested in what states of affairs a being might 
bumble into or somehow inadvertently produce. Instead, we are inter-
ested in the states of affairs the agent is in a position to bring about via ac-
tions. And not just that. For actions can and often to have unintended side 
effects. And, again, when we wonder about the abilities or potency of an 
agent, we aren't asking about what she might accidentally produce as the 
result of an action intended to produce some other end. What we want is 
an account of what that being is in a position to bring about intentionally. 
It would seem that it will do no harm, even on the view that potency is to 
be explicated by what states of affairs the being is capable of producing, if 
we instead focus on what we might call' successful acts.' A successful act 
is an act that is successful in producing the end to which it is aimed. So if 
I have the power to lift a stone, then we can say somewhat more perspicu-
ously, that I can perform the success-act of lifting the stone. Let's assume 
that we are only interested in success-acts, and so henceforth, I'll drop the 
modifier "success" and speak only of acts. 
So I can lift the stone iff I can perform the act of lifting the stone. Let's 
suppose furthermore that if I can perform the act of lifting the stone, then 
there is some possible world in which I am otherwise much as I am now 
and I do lift the stone.5 So to find out more about what must be the case if 
I can in fact lift the stone, we must think about what must happen at these 
worlds in which I actually do perform the action of lifting the stone. 
Because we are here interested only in actions that produce the effects 
at which they aim, we can consider only what must be true in order for 
one to perform such an act. 
So let's consider this claim: 
1: I can lift a stone weighing 100 pounds 
Now given our necessary and sufficient condition for 'can' statements it 
follows that 
2: I can perform the act of lifting a stone weighing 100 pounds. 
And given our necessary condition for performing an action it follows that 
3: There is a world W at which I am much as I am now where I per-
form the act of lifting a stone weighing 100 pounds. 
But what does (3) require? That a pair of conditions obtain: I must have 
the capacity to lift the 100-pound stone and I must have the all-things-
considered will to lift it. If I have only the capacity, the stone will remain 
unlifted. If I only have the all-things-considered will, the stone will remain 
unlifted. But if I have the all-things-considered will and the capacity; then 
I will perform the act of lifting the stone.6 
Therefore we can say that, given (I), (2), and (3) the following is true: 
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4 At W, I have the all-things-considered will to lift the stone and the 
capacity to lift the stone. 
Let's complicate things just a bit. Suppose I had some horrible experience 
with a hot-pink object when 1 was a child that left me with an uncontrol-
lable aversion to hot-pink things. I simply cannot make myself knowingly 
touch them. Now let's assume that I regularly lift gray stones weighing 
100 pounds. Still, it may occur to us to wonder if the following is true: 
5: I can perform the act of lifting a hot-pink stone weighing 100 
pounds. 
On the one hand, it seems silly to think that (2) is true but (5) is false. How 
could the mere color of the object sap me of my lifting strength? Yet it also 
seems true to say that you can't lift an object that you can't touch, and if 
I literally can't knowingly touch any hot-pink object, then I can't know-
ingly touch the stone in question, and so I can't perform the act of lifting 
it. Although we might be tempted to think there is a paradox here (I both 
can and cannot lift hot-pink stones), this conflict is resolvable using the 
distinctions above. 
I can lift a stone in Wanly if there is a world where I am fundamentally 
like I am in Wand in which 1 lift the stone. Now, given my deep-seeded 
aversion to hot-pink objects, there is no world at which I am fundamen-
tally like I am at the actual world (we are supposing) and I lift the hot-pink 
stone. So I cannot lift it and (5) is false. However, there is nothing particu-
larly puzzling or paradoxical about this because we are assuming that I 
can lift a stone only if I have the capacity for lifting stones of that weight 
and an ability to will to lift this particular stone. So my being unable to lift 
the stone doesn't entail that I lack the capacity for lifting stones that size or 
that I even lack the capacity to lift that stone (since its weight is well within 
my lifting range). My inability in this case is a failure of my will and not 
my capacity for stone lifting. 
So I cannot lift the stone, although I do have the capacity to lift it. Does 
thi, mean that I lack the power to lift it? I don't see why. If I have the power 
to ]ift a loa-pound gray stone but lack the power to lift a lOa-pound hot-
pink stone, then these are distinct powers. But why should we think that? 
As far as I can see, the only reason to individuate powers this finely is the 
conviction that "s cannot do X" entails "s lacks the power to X." But once 
we see that the explanation for the former can be a failure of will rath-
er than capacity, we should see that the entailment fails to hold. Indeed, 
these considerations might be taken to show that by "capacity" we've re-
ally been picking out the very same concept that we pick out when we use 
"power" in these contexts. 
Now Funkhouser has a response to the kind of reply I've been detail-
ing. Funkhouser thinks that the distinction between (in my terms) what 
a being has the ability to will on the one hand and what a being has the 
capacity to do on the other is untenable for God. In other intelligent be-
ings, Funkhouser avers, the will and the capacity to do things are distinct 
faculties. Regarding the earlier example involving the hot-pink rock, we 
can say that qua the faculty of the will, I cannot lift it but qua my capacity 
for lifting, I can. Yet in God there is not supposed to be any such distinc-
tion between faculties; the doctrine of divine simplicity requires a lack of 
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complexity in the mind and will of God. Instead of talking of two distinct 
faculties, then, we must speak of God's "will-power" -a combination of 
what God is able to will and has the capacity to do. What God can do is 
what God has the will-power to do. So if there are things God is unable 
to do, the explanation must be simply that God lacks the will-power, and 
not that, for example, God has the capacity to do them but lacks the will. 
Therefore, if God cannot do something, God simply lacks the will-power 
to do it. 
My reply to this is two-fold. Although the doctrine of simplicity has 
been a historically important doctrine in Christian theism, it no longer 
holds the sway it once held over theologians. So if cornered, a theist might 
be willing to grant whatever complexity is necessary for a separation of 
God's will and God's capacities. 
However (and this is the second part of my reply) such a concession 
isn't necessary. Suppose with Funkhouser that the literal, metaphysical 
truth is that God has neither will nor capacity but has instead the joint 
will-power. So, given our earlier example, there are no worlds at which 
this will-power extends to the stabbing of innocent children. But there are 
worlds at which it extends to the stabbing of physically similar beings of 
the same size and consistency. Furthermore, there are worlds at which 
God destroys entire galaxies but none at which his destroying such galax-
ies fails to be morally justified. Given a thorough description of all worlds 
consistent with God's will-power and those inconsistent with God's will-
power, we will be able to see that the former set will be exactly the same 
as the set of worlds that would be consistent with God's having distinct 
faculties in virtue of which God is omnipotent and impeccable. And the 
latter will be the very same set as the set that is inconsistent with God's 
having those distinct faculties. But since even Funkhouser seems willing 
to grant that God would be omnipotent and impeccable were God's will 
and God's capacities distinct, and since uniting the faculties does nothing 
to limit or expand the worlds and actions open to God, we should surely 
conclude that God is omnipotent and impeccable even if God's will and 
power are united. That is, Funkhouser claims that because of the doctrine 
of simplicity, God can't be both omnipotent and impeccable; but if we hold 
everything else the same except for the unity of God's will and capacity, 
then omnipotence and impeccability are compossible. Yet it is hard to see 
how the unity of God's will and capacity could somehow deprive God of 
power given that the separation of the will and power would have made 
no difference at all with respect to which worlds might have been actual. 
Therefore, we should conclude that divine simplicity does not provide 
Funkhouser with a satisfactory reply to the objection to premise two of 
his original. Hence we should conclude that the objection holds and that 
"God cannot do X" fails to entail that "God lacks the power to do X." 
Hence we should fail to conclude that there is a conflict between omnipo-
tence and impeccability? 
The University of Arkansas 
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NOTES 
1. I'm here assuming that the Anselmian conception of God entails that 
if God exists, then God is the most powerful being at any world at which he 
exists and that he exists at all worlds. Of course, this entailment only holds 
if, necessarily, being necessarily existent and the most powerful being at all 
worlds at which the being exists are possibly exemplified, compossible, and 
jointly better to have than to lack. Funkhouser would, I believe, reject this en-
tailment of the Anselmian conception but for the present it will do no harm to 
suppose, with the standard Anselmian, that this entailment holds. 
2. Funkhouser, p. 416. 
3. For more on this limited modal skepticism, see Peter van Inwagen's pa-
per "Modal Epistemology" in Philosophical Studies 92 (1998), pp. 67-84. 
i. In what follows, I am indebted to Thomas V. Morris's discussion in 
chapter 4 (liThe Power of God") of his book Our Idea of God (Notre Dame Press, 
1991). 
J. It should be noted the qualification "I am much like I am now" is need-
ed to avoid the consequence that a quadriplegic is able to lift a 100-pound 
stone. I take it that even though the quadriplegic can lift the stone in worlds at 
which he isn't a quadriplegic, that shouldn't incline us to say that he can lift a 
stone in those worlds at which he is a quadriplegic. 
6. To say that the combination of capacity and all-things-considered de-
sire is sufficient for my performing the action is an oversimplification, and for 
more than one reason. First, there may be cases involving weakness of will 
or depression in which it would be natural to say both that a person has the 
capacity and all-things-considered desire to X but nevertheless fails to X. Sec-
ond, one may have the all-things-considered desire and the capacity yet fail 
to do X because she can't accomplish X each time she tries. To borrow from J. 
L. Austin's example, a golfer might have the desire to sink a difficult 40 foot 
putt, and, being an accomplished golfer, have the capacity to make it but lack 
the ability to sink it every time she tries. Both kinds of problems show that 
more would need to be said if my aim here were to give a satisfactory account 
of agency. But these kinds of difficulties are presumably not relevant for the 
purpose at hand and so it will suffice to make note of them and move on. 
7. Thanks to Eric Funkhouser for discussion and detailed comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
